Gestures of Belonging: Disability and Postcoloniality in Bessie Head's _A Question of Power_ by Kruger, Liam
132 Disability and Postcoloniality in Bessie Head’s A Question of Power
MFS Modern Fiction Studies, Volume 65, number 1, Spring 2019.  
Copyright © 2019 for the Purdue Research Foundation by Johns Hopkins University Press. 
All rights to reproduction in any form reserved.
Gestures of Belonging:  
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in Bessie Head’s A Question 
of Power
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The essay that follows has two overlapping but distinct aims. The first 
and more modest is to respond to Elizabeth J. Donaldson’s 2011 essay 
“Revisiting the Corpus of the Madwoman,” which traces the theoriza-
tion of disability in Charlotte Brontë’s Jane Eyre (1847) and Jean Rhys’s 
Wide Sargasso Sea (1966) through their handling of Bertha Mason, the 
paradigmatic madwoman in the attic. Donaldson identifies a biomedi-
cal, eugenicist model of disability in Jane Eyre that Wide Sargasso Sea, 
a postcolonial revision of Brontë’s novel, responds to with a deeply 
social model of disability. Donaldson responds in turn by recuperat-
ing the value of the medical model to posit a sociomedical model in 
Jane Eyre, on the basis that “theories that pay attention exclusively to 
the social causes and construction of mad identity while overlook-
ing the material conditions of the body . . . have a limited political 
scope” (95). I would suggest, somewhat anachronistically, that Bessie 
Head’s 1973 novel A Question of Power can be read as a fourth term 
in that conversation running from Brontë to Rhys to Donaldson; 
Head demonstrates, at least in the context of the postcolony, that the 
f
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distinction between social and medical models of disability ceases to 
be meaningful in situations of extreme precarity—that is, of multiple 
exclusions from the political or social sphere on such bases as race, na-
tionality, class, and/or gender expression, among others. Donaldson 
gestures to the possibility of such a reading when she describes “the 
impossible task of reconciling medical discourses of mental illness, 
which describe the symbolic failure of the self-determined individual, 
and the competing discourses of democratic citizenship, in which will 
and self are imagined as inviolable—a tension that lies at the heart 
of both liberal individualism and the impairment-disability system” 
(107). Head’s novel offers an example of how mental illness and dis-
ability might be theorized without recourse to the self-determined 
individual’s symbolic failure.
My second aim is more ambitious: I examine Head’s treatment 
of madness in A Question of Power before proceeding to a generalized 
discussion of disability in postcolonial literature and scholarship. This 
novel features a mixed-race single mother refugee who appears to be 
suffering from a “mental breakdown” (13)—to use Head’s term—
in a colonial and postcolonial context wherein categories of race, 
gender, sex, class, and ability are heavily policed. In such a novel, I 
ask, is madness a subjective symptom of colonial oppression, a tool 
of systemic social exclusion under the colonial state apparatus, a 
somatically contingent mental impairment that is particularly heav-
ily policed in the colony and postcolony, some combination of the 
above, or something else entirely? I’m particularly invested in how 
postcolonial literature demonstrates the limitations of either the 
social or medical models of disability in the postcolonial context. I 
suggest that these limitations reveal the failures of both the social 
and medical models more generally. Further, the contexts that dem-
onstrate these limitations are not specific to the postcolony. Rather, 
as the hegemonic West enacts the neoliberal process that Achille 
Mbembe understands as “capitalism set[ting] about recolonizing 
its own center” (179), it generates within itself states of exclusion 
that were previously particular to the colony and postcolony. As a 
result, the limitations of the social and medical models of disability 
continue to become increasingly more pronounced. Neoliberalism 
erodes material, legal, and communal structures of support every-
where (if not everywhere at the same rate) in its ongoing process of 
redistributing wealth into the hands of those who already have it. As 
such, the failures of both the social and medical models of disability 
to apprehend adequately the experience of madness as articulated 
by Head’s and her protagonist’s exceptional precarity indicate how 
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those models might continue to fail if that precarity continues to be 
globally distributed by the multiple dispossessions of finance capital.
The failure of the medical and social models to apprehend pre-
carity can be understood as a consequence of the extent to which both 
models posit disability as a deficit. The medical model posits a deficit 
insofar as a given individual would be normate, autonomous, and 
able were it not for a particular embodied impairment, whereas the 
social model suggests that contingent social and material conditions 
prevent specifically impaired individuals from autonomous ableness, 
which they would be granted in differently structured contexts. Head 
offers a gentle corrective to such readings. While norms do circulate 
in this novel, they are inconsistently and indifferently enforced, 
without any sense of an ideal or fully autonomous way of being that 
her protagonist, Elizabeth, departs from or returns to. Regardless of 
whether she is suffering from her madness or enmeshed within the 
collective, at no point is Head’s protagonist entirely autonomous or 
safe. As a result, the novel provokes precisely those anxieties that 
Margrit Schildrick describes as being occasioned by “any compromise 
of control over one’s own body, any indication of interdependency 
or connectivity, or of corporeal instability” (2). Further, A Question of 
Power so persistently resists any etiological reading of madness that 
it is unclear whether Elizabeth’s madness precedes (and so partially 
causes) her social alienation or vice versa (such that the two precari-
ous positions collapse into one another).
A Question of Power was published in 1973, nine years after Head 
permanently fled apartheid South Africa to settle in Botswana, which 
had become an independent republic in 1966. The novel’s plot 
is fairly schematic. The protagonist, Elizabeth, is a South African 
Coloured woman living in the small village of Motabeng, Botswana, 
with her son.1 As a refugee from the neighboring apartheid state, 
Elizabeth feels estranged from her Tswana neighbors because of 
her linguistic, racial, and national identities; she is also tormented 
by vivid, confusing, and sexually violent hallucinations, which she 
attempts to self-medicate with sedatives and alcohol. This results in 
two “mental breakdowns.” The first causes Elizabeth to lose her job 
as an elementary school teacher, forcing her to find work at a farm-
ing cooperative run by an Afrikaner refugee and staffed by a mixture 
of local and foreign volunteers. The second briefly lands her in a 
mental asylum, from which she is released when the white warden 
is convinced that she shares his “racialist” views of the black asylum 
staff (47). On Elizabeth’s return to the cooperative, her son, who 
speaks fluent Tswana and has developed friendships in the village, 
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helps her to immerse herself gradually into the village’s network of 
relations; at around the same time, her hallucinations come to what 
appears to be a definitive end. 
Despite its relatively straightforward narrative of cure and as-
similation, the novel devotes considerable attention to Elizabeth’s hal-
lucinations, her reflections on these hallucinations, and the narrator’s 
interpretation thereof. Where several weeks of farm work might be 
described in two lines of text, a single night’s visions can extend for 
thirty pages. This uneven dilation of time alone would seem to trouble 
any straightforward reading of A Question of Power as a linear novel of 
recovery or reconciliation (although the novel at times also lends itself 
to such a reading). The novel closes with Elizabeth ostensibly cured 
and finding some rootedness in her adoptive community and in her 
own body. The final line reads, “as she fell asleep, she placed one soft 
hand over her land. It was a gesture of belonging” (206). Because this 
moment takes place with Elizabeth indoors, in her bed, scholars like 
Eleni Coundouriotis read “her land” euphemistically. Such a reading 
posits that Head overtly draws a relationship between embodiment 
and nation, suggesting that there is a correlation between Elizabeth 
finding a way to belong in Botswana and getting through her gauntlet 
of hallucinations, many of which center explicitly on her ambivalence 
toward her gender, race, and sexual anatomy. Moreover, Head inverts 
the standard colonial—and indeed postcolonial—metaphor of land 
as feminine body or motherland by instead recasting Elizabeth’s body 
as the land in which she finally finds her place.
Most criticism on A Question of Power has discussed how, given 
Head’s multiple dispossessions by race, gender, geography, nation, 
language, mental illness, and class, she narrates the creation of a 
community at communal, regional, or universal levels. Because of the 
extreme precarity of both Elizabeth’s and Head’s subject positions, 
scholarship tends to focus on the extent to which A Question of Power 
fulfills or attempts to fulfill the imperative toward assimilation and 
overcoming deeply fragmented subjectivities.2 Previous scholarship 
generally pairs this imperative toward assimilation with an investment 
in the overlaps between Head’s biography and Elizabeth’s narrative. 
Scholars focus especially on the fact that Elizabeth shares Head’s ex-
perience of childhood abandonment, exile, and mental impairment. 
Jacqueline Rose, for instance, writes:
Head, like the character Elizabeth, was born in a mental hospital [in 
South Africa] to a white mother put away because she was pregnant 
by a native. Sent first to a nursing home and then to a Boer family, 
both of which returned her because she was black, Head, again 
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like Elizabeth in the novel, was finally taken in by a Coloured foster 
mother whom she believed to be her real mother until the age of 
thirteen. (409)
Head’s account of Elizabeth’s two mental breakdowns and subsequent 
cure has its own parallels in her autobiographical renderings of her 
time in Botswana. Criticism’s investment in the overlap among Head’s 
biography, Elizabeth’s madness, and Head and Elizabeth’s political 
state is in part justified. Head’s precarious refugee status in Botswana 
and her mental health designation were contingent on one another: 
“As pressures mounted, she began to fear that the Botswanans might 
certify her as insane in order to deport her to South Africa where 
she would be forced to reenact her mother’s institutional history. 
The specter of Sammy Peterson, a fellow refugee, exacerbated her 
apprehension: the Botswanans had turned him over to the South 
African regime, who had incarcerated him on trumped-up charges 
of dementia” (Nixon 116). The extent to which madness operates as 
a tool of social exclusion or control under the colonial state appara-
tus—even, as in this case, beyond the borders of the settler-colonial 
apartheid state that maintained considerable influence over the 
neighboring Botswana—encourages a reading that conflates Head’s 
and Elizabeth’s fugitive states with mental illness. 
This reading, beyond even conflating the biographical with the 
fictional, falls into the trap of equating Elizabeth’s madness with what 
Sharon Snyder and David Mitchell identify as “narrative prosthesis” 
(49), in which disability becomes the “crutch upon which literary nar-
ratives lean for their representational power, disruptive potentiality, 
and analytical insight.” In this way, the critical tendency is consistent 
with what Clare Barker perceives as a particular congruity between 
postcoloniality and disability and between postcolonial literature and 
disability in literature:
disability lends postcolonial fiction some of its most potent and per-
vasive images and metaphors: dismembered nation-states; silenced 
subaltern subjects; economies crippled by international debt; healing 
through decolonization and the reclamation of indigenous knowl-
edge. As a trope, a narrative device, disability enables postcolonial 
writers to tell vivid stories about colonialism and its aftermath, stories 
that resonate outward from a character’s disabled body to address 
“damage,” inequality, and power and its abuses in the postcolonial 
world. (100)
What this analytical leaning cannot account for, however, is that 
Elizabeth’s madness is not a consistently theorized condition in A 
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Question of Power. That is, Head offers no stable etiology of madness 
that would allow for a straightforward reading of madness. The un-
stable and untheorized nature of Elizabeth’s mental illness, whose 
etiologies vacillate between the social, medical, and supernatural, 
along with the fact that no obvious reason for her cure is explicitly 
stated, seems to me to be precisely the point; any tropic reading of 
disability is consistently subverted. As a prosthesis, whether narrative 
or analytic, madness in this novel is remarkably unreliable.3
Elizabeth’s madness primarily manifests in regular, lengthy hal-
lucinatory episodes in which three, maybe four, personalities—Sello 
the monk, Sello in the brown suit, Dan, and Medusa—variously 
lecture, console, harangue, and torment her, with Dan in particular 
frequently inflicting visions of sexual violence on Elizabeth. Her in-
teractions with these personalities typically feature some discussion of 
gender, sex, race, and morality, with Sello in the brown suit, Dan, and 
Medusa regularly attacking Elizabeth for deficiencies in these arenas. 
Head deploys third-person past tense without any clear stylistic 
or visual markers to indicate a shift from the hallucinations to the 
novel’s reality (save for occasional dilations between the time of the 
narrative and the time of the narration), and the hallucinations do 
seem to have some real-world effects. Early in the novel, a friend of 
Elizabeth’s overhears a comment by Sello the monk, though by this 
point Elizabeth has resigned herself to being the victim of “intangible 
form[s]” discernible only to her (23); after a vision of being attacked 
by Medusa with “lightning bolts,” Elizabeth awakens to find scorched 
patches on the floor of her hut (92); a nightmarish vision of Sello’s 
face transforming into that of an owl is complemented by the appear-
ance of a dead owl on Elizabeth’s doorstep the following morning. 
The ontological status of a given described event, then, is always in 
question, and the reader is made to share in Elizabeth’s uncertainty. 
Following an extended and presumably internal monologue about 
the impossibility of communicating her hallucinatory experiences to 
Eugene, the Afrikaner manager of the farming cooperative, Eliza-
beth discovers, alongside the reader, that the monologue has been 
external:
She couldn’t even begin to say: “Well, you know Sello, don’t you? He 
isn’t all he seems to be on the surface—the progressive Botswana 
farmer, eager to discuss the latest agricultural techniques. He’s re-
ally Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. And he confided some extraordinary 
things to me, so I’m not sure I’m quite normal any more. I don’t 
think people who conduct telepathic relationships with other people 
are normal anyway, but I never thought it would happen to me . . .”
She started a little; she had said her last thoughts out loud. (57–58) 
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What’s crucial to note here is how the final sentence retroactively 
shifts the significance of the preceding chain of thoughts by calling 
into question how much of it—the entire paragraph or just the last 
sentence—she conveyed “out loud.” The reader experiences Eliza-
beth’s uncertainty as she attempts to interpret her own experiences. 
This experience would fall in line precisely with received ideas about 
canonical or hegemonic metropolitan literary modernism along the 
lines of Conrad, Woolf, or James if the novel were about that inter-
pretation, but it doesn’t seem to be, or at least not entirely.4 We’re 
left, then, with a porous text that is uncommonly uninterested in its 
own lacunae. 
Head’s depiction of madness here operates through the in-
definitely deferred resolution of ambiguities; the reader, along with 
Elizabeth, is never entirely sure which norms can be taken as givens 
and which cannot. Within this passage, we see at least three somewhat 
distinct kinds of normality that are each determined by behaviors or 
ways of being that fail to conform to those norms. First is that norm 
violated by Sello, who is at once a farmer in the community and a 
figure who taunts Elizabeth during her hallucinatory episodes; Sello 
is remarkable for being, at least as far as Elizabeth is concerned, 
other than what he seems to be. Elizabeth herself is in violation of 
another norm because she believes that she has been contaminated 
by Sello. That is, simply by having “extraordinary things” confided to 
her, she ceases to be certain that she’s “quite normal.” Finally, both 
Sello and Elizabeth are described as being in violation of the norm of 
not “conduct[ing] telepathic relationships with other people.” This 
phrasing leaves open the possibility that telepathic relationships are 
possible but simply abnormal. The grounds that constitute normality 
here are persistently shifting, and there are no guarantees that they 
will remain consistent from one moment to the next. The passage 
begins with Elizabeth (or the narrator) doubtful that she will be able 
to communicate her affliction to Eugene; it concludes with her having 
communicated too much and the reader never finding out exactly 
how much is too much. At the level of the text and interpretation, 
the reader experiences the same persistently shifting parameters 
as Elizabeth seems to be experiencing here. In formalist terms, the 
syuzhet undermines the stability of any given fabula we might choose 
to extrapolate from it, rendering this text—and the madness it ad-
dresses—porous, unstable, and protean.5
In addition to the text’s porousness, an additional pair of prob-
lems—or multiplicity of problems deriving from two disciplines—
emerge: the burden of signification for both the postcolonial novel 
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and disability in the context of literary production. The postcolonial 
text is made to do the work of representing the texture of the post-
colonial experience to a typically Western or Western-facing audi-
ence, which comes with risks for both the writer and the place in 
question. As Nirvana Tanoukhi summarizes, “no sooner do writers 
accomplish the task of making a convincing or compelling depiction 
of a particular people and place than they must immediately confront 
the possibility that their story will be so generalized as to become the 
sanctioned representation of the life of a country” (670). The text 
that features disability, which is also usually aimed at or accessible to 
a normate audience, runs the risk of excessive signification. We think 
here, for instance, of the “sanctioned representation[s]” of disability 
suggested by Rosemarie Garland-Thomson’s assertion that “by its very 
presence, the exceptional body seems to compel explanation, inspire 
representation, and incite regulation” (1). This is not to conflate the 
conditions of postcolonial subjectivity or disability, nor postcolonial 
art and artistic depictions of disability, but to suggest that the vexed 
nature of signification in either of the two latter fields renders the 
process of interpretation a fraught one; indeed, interpretation is a 
freight that multiplies in the context of a postcolonial novel that, like 
A Question of Power, features a disabled protagonist. 
A literary treatment of disability in general and madness in 
particular need not signify anything more than itself, especially in a 
context where an author draws on embodied experiences of disability 
to generate her work. However, such treatments are often made to 
do more work either in popular reception or in criticism. Let me, 
therefore, attempt to delineate how madness operates in Head’s text 
and context. The decision to work from madness outward to the 
postcolonial context, rather than inward from the postcolonial con-
text to how madness operates within it, is a consequence of both the 
text’s relationship to coloniality and madness and the slightly vexed 
nature of theorizing mental disability in the context of the postcolony. 
Head’s novel seems to be clearly aware of the constructedness 
of race and gender as social categories that are designed to gener-
ate controllable subjects. Explicitly articulating that racism precedes 
race, that racial categories structurally produce inequality in a settler-
colonial context rather than descriptively reflect reality, the narrator 
observes, “There [in South Africa] they said the black man was natu-
rally dull, stupid, inferior, but they made sure to deprive him of the 
education which developed personality, intellect, skill” (57). Head 
treats gender somewhat less critically, since the Medusa that torments 
Elizabeth seems to operate as a substitute for African femininity, or at 
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least is largely engaged in attacking Elizabeth on the grounds of her 
failure to be entirely African or entirely feminine. Even so, an early 
encounter with the Peace Corps volunteer Tom offers the following:
She was later to depend on Tom heavily for the return of her sanity, 
but that night, just as he was about to leave, he laughed and turned 
towards her and said: “You’re a strange woman, Elizabeth. The 
things you draw out of a man! You know, men don’t really discuss 
the deep metaphysical profundities with women. Oh, they talk about 
love and things like that, but their deepest feelings they reserve for 
other men.” (24)
The novel is not so univocal in its critique of Western imperialism 
that everything the white, male, American Peace Corps volunteer says 
ought to be read as sarcastic, as the proleptic first clause signals; but 
there is a critique of, or at least ambivalence toward, an essentializ-
ing, binary construction of gender here. After Tom leaves, Elizabeth 
reflects on her ostensibly hallucinatory relationship with Sello: “The 
base of it was masculine. Right from the start, Sello had the air of 
one who was simply picking up the threads of a long friendship.” 
Elizabeth will repeat this ambivalence to her assigned gender identity 
elsewhere in the novel. Thus, while race and gender categories are 
subject to more or less explicit critique and theorization, the catego-
ries of sanity and insanity are not explicitly dealt with. As the above 
passage demonstrates, “sanity” is a term that Head (or her narrator) 
uses without needing to query it, however regular and frictionless the 
slippages between lucid and hallucinated scenes might be.
The objection may reasonably be raised that I am critiquing a 
thoroughly critiqued, if persistent, notion of liberal individualism 
without theorizing or accounting for alternative models of subjec-
tivity, which is a glaring omission in a postcolonial text that appears 
to be at least partially in conversation with such models. The model 
of the liberal subject remains important in the postcolonial context 
because of colonization’s profound epistemic impact on its victims; 
the evasion and undermining of the model of the liberal subject in 
postcolonial studies is an important and fruitful one, but we should 
not lose sight of the fact that, as Tejumola Olaniyan observes, “to 
evade something . . . is to wish it does not exist, or that it is no longer 
useful” (49). Hence, I am hesitant to answer Clare Barker and Stu-
art Murray’s call for disability theorists “to take particular, situated 
experiences as the starting point for disability analysis, enabling acts 
of criticism emerging from and informed by (rather than applied to) 
‘cultural locatedness’” (228), rather than “imposing a hegemonic 
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model of disability.” This gesture risks ignoring the fact that these 
hegemonic models of disability are already imposed on the colonial 
and postcolonial contexts, where the state apparatus for evaluating 
madness is precisely a leftover of—an imposition by—the colonial 
period. This is not to assert the totalizing force of Western hegemony, 
which is not evenly spread or evenly accepted, but to concede its pro-
found influence in the case of postcolonial, or indeed neocolonial, 
Botswana. One consequence of Western imperialism in Africa has 
been to impose a normate identity that need not be coextensive with 
the statistical norms of any given subjected society. While that imposi-
tion has not been absolute, its impact is still strongly felt. This impact, 
taken alongside Head’s ambivalent cultural inheritance (writing in 
English without any access to African languages), would incline me 
toward using the hegemonic, Western-facing disabilities discourse 
(however provisionally) while attempting to adjust for contextual 
frameworks of knowledge where applicable, all while exploring how 
madness operates in A Question of Power. 
One clear limit for such Western-facing discourse would be the 
novel’s suggestions that Elizabeth’s madness might be a consequence 
of witchcraft, which obviously doesn’t fit neatly into either the social or 
medical models of disability. I confess to being uncertain of precisely 
how to accommodate it. Elizabeth speaks about witchcraft more than 
once. Although she generally jokes about it, witchcraft also appears 
during her hallucinations, which makes it difficult to determine their 
sincerity. Still, the sequence in which Elizabeth discovers the dead 
owl on her doorstep after seeing Sello with an owl’s face is unsettling 
because it either indicates that the hallucination has bled into the 
world or that the owl being left on her doorstep caused the halluci-
nation. As a result, we are never certain about which way causality 
flows. I mention this in the context of Elizabeth’s social exclusion 
because Elizabeth’s first mental breakdown immediately follows the 
discovery of the owl. This sequence of events also leads to her first 
interview with Eugene:
“You don’t seem to get along with the local people,” he observed.
 "It’s not that,” Elizabeth said, anxiously. “People don’t care 
here whether foreigners get along with them or not. They are deeply 
absorbed in each other.” She paused and laughed. “They have a 
saying that Batswana witchcraft only works on a Motswana, not an 
outsider. I like the general atmosphere because I don’t care whether 
people like me or not. I am used to isolation.”
 “Too much isolation isn’t a good thing for anyone,” he said. 
(56) 
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If this is an instance of the novel offering a magical etiology for 
Elizabeth’s madness, it does so in the obliquest possible manner. Un-
prompted, Elizabeth offers a non sequitur about Batswana witchcraft 
that is pertinent only insofar as she is discussing a local indifference 
to outsiders, which extends to local witchcraft being effective only 
on members of the community, a category from which Elizabeth 
and Eugene implicitly exclude themselves. Eugene ignores this and 
instead offers a bromide on the level of “you should get out more.” 
The fact that this utterance takes place so shortly after the discovery 
of the dead owl, is so utterly unprompted, and is a singular instance 
of the supernatural being referred to in what is clearly the real world 
of the novel is about as much evidence for a magical etiology of 
madness as the novel offers. I mention this scene because, if taken 
seriously, it suggests that Elizabeth’s madness is at once a mecha-
nism of social exclusion, a consequence of social exclusion, and a 
mechanism of social inclusion insofar as the madness leads her to 
Eugene’s cooperative, where she begins to establish connections 
with the local community, becomes retroactively susceptible to the 
Batswana witchcraft that leads her there, and subsequently appears 
to be cured.6 Even here, demonstrably, I am inclined toward a social 
interpretation wherein witchcraft operates as a social mechanism that 
is at first disabling for Elizabeth but eventually leads to her assimila-
tion into the village community and apparent cure. This fits fairly 
neatly with Barker’s suggestion that, within the postcolonial novel, 
“‘[i]mpairment’ does not necessarily ‘diminish personhood,’ but can 
instead provide a focal point for emphasizing communal strength, 
inclusivity, and solidarity” (100). More to the point, the possibility of 
a supernatural etiology for Elizabeth’s hallucinations looms in this 
text, never firmly advanced or firmly rebutted, and thus prevents any 
stable investment in either the social or medical model of disability.
That said, the novel appears more invested in the social model 
of disability insofar as the postcolonial context in which Elizabeth 
operates generates her “mental breakdown.” This generation takes 
two forms, however: the sense that madness is a constructed category 
of exclusion deployed strategically by the apartheid regime in South 
Africa and the sense that the oppressions encountered in the contexts 
of either South Africa or neighboring Botswana lead to Elizabeth’s 
mental breakdown. We see the former most explicitly in the narrative 
of Elizabeth’s mother. A gaunt mission school principal relates this 
narrative to Elizabeth at the novel’s opening: “We have a full docket 
on you. You must be very careful. Your mother was insane. If you’re 
not careful you’ll get insane just like your mother. Your mother was 
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a white woman. They had to lock her up, as she was having a child 
by the stable boy, who was a native” (16). Elizabeth’s mother, then, 
has her sanity defined solely in terms of her conformity to South Af-
rica’s Immorality Amendment Act of 1957, which prohibited sexual 
intercourse between individuals of different taxonomized racial cat-
egories; here, however, the simultaneous deployment of the medical 
or biological and social models is borne out by the suggestion that 
Elizabeth might inherit this “insanity” (16). Indeed, under the social 
model and apartheid South Africa’s strict policing of alterity, Elizabeth 
must inevitably inherit this insanity if we take insanity to mean devia-
tion from the prescribed norm; after all, she is embodied evidence 
of nonconformity to the 1957 Act. This medicosocial model operates 
in a feedback loop in this context: “The other children soon noticed 
something unusual about Elizabeth’s isolation periods. They could 
fight and scratch and bite each other, but if she did likewise she was 
locked up. They took to kicking at her with deliberate malice as she 
sat in a corner reading a book” (16). This instance testifies that the 
category of madness is self-reinforcing insofar as the neglect inflicted 
on a child identified as being potentially insane solicits precisely the 
behavior that would support such a diagnosis.
The problem here is that Elizabeth only begins to suffer from 
her hallucinations and breakdowns—or at least, only reports them—
after she permanently leaves South Africa. One line of interpretation 
suggests that the newly independent Botswanan context is one from 
which a white imperialist hegemony had only recently retreated; 
even so, the same cultural nationalism that had recently been used to 
support Botswana’s nation-statehood also risked drawing sharp lines 
around what was and was not African. Elizabeth, however, is once 
again excluded, albeit under somewhat less militarized conditions. 
The novel’s own interpretive heuristic supports this:
She had been so intensely drawn inwards over a certain period that 
her mind dwelt entirely at the intangible level of shifting images 
and strange arguments. She lay quietly staring in the dark. Why was 
everything so pointed, so absorbingly profound? The wild-eyed Me-
dusa was expressing the surface reality of African society. It was shut 
in and exclusive. It had a strong theme of power-worship running 
through it, and power people needed small, narrow, shut-in worlds. 
They never felt secure in the big, wide flexible universe where there 
were too many cross-currents of opposing thought. (38)
The relationship between Elizabeth’s mental health and the social 
context in which she lives is made explicit here. Medusa, Elizabeth’s 
hallucination, articulates the reality of African society; Elizabeth is 
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not so much “drawn inwards” as forced by that society’s “shut in and 
exclusive” nature. At other times, however, Medusa is described to 
us as “Buddha’s wife” (43) and “seven thousand towering vaginas” 
(45), and it isn’t clear if these appellations are meant to be accretive 
or if they shift with the uncertain ontologies of the novel. In this mo-
ment at least, Elizabeth’s madness seems to come as a response to 
an overdetermined and internally contradictory social environment, 
which resonates with Sander Gilman’s recognition of the Renaissance 
conceit that “one’s mad actions are a sign of sanity in a world gone 
mad” (116) or Phyllis Chesler’s more pointed assertion that “many 
[women] may be reacting to or trying to escape . . . repression and 
the powerlessness it signifies by ‘going mad’” (37). This is precisely 
the model that Jean Rhys extends in Wide Sargasso Sea, “a threnody for 
the defeat of the feminine as the only tragic indictment of the mas-
culine available” (Patke 191), and it is precisely the limited possibility 
of meaningful rebellion from this mad subjectivity that Donaldson 
attempts to warn against in “Revisiting the Corpus of the Madwoman” 
when she cites Shoshana Felman’s point that “depressed and terrified 
women are not about to seize the means of production and repro-
duction” (Felman qtd. in Donaldson 93). Donaldson’s intervention 
is to return to Jane Eyre by “thinking through a new feminist theory 
of embodiment and mental illness” (95), remaining sensitive to the 
overdetermined social structures that Rhys is critiquing, but alive, 
too, to Bertha Mason’s physical embodiment, so as to contextualize 
her madness as “a matrilineal legacy of national, ethnic identity, and 
physical disorder” (99). 
Head is at least as ambivalent as Donaldson about any purely 
social model of disability, although her estrangement from any kind 
of matrilineal, national, or ethnic identities would highlight the 
constructedness of even these terms.7 A naturalized social model of 
disability is voiced by Eugene, the exiled Afrikaner who encounters 
Elizabeth during her first breakdown, has her hospitalized, and later 
offers to help her after inadvertently disclosing her hallucinations: 
“She had to choke back a rush of words. . . . [S]he could see that he 
was working on the simple theory that South Africans usually suffered 
from some form of mental aberration, so she only nodded her head 
in agreement to his offer of assistance” (58). I use the admittedly 
contradictory construction “naturalized social model” to indicate the 
ambivalence of Eugene’s “simple theory.” Does the mental aberration 
follow from being a South African forced to live under the inequi-
ties of the apartheid regime? Is the “form” of “mental aberration” 
contingent on particular South Africans—hardly a unified identity 
category, now as then—given how seriously race, gender, and class 
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determine relationships to power? What is the norm against which 
this aberration is measured? And does such aberration follow even 
South Africans in exile, who—like Eugene and Elizabeth—have 
renounced or challenged their national identity? Neither Head nor 
Eugene answer these questions; they only leave us with a formula: if 
one is South African, then likely one experiences some form of mental 
aberration. This “simple theory” offers as natural or naturalized law 
a correlation between mental impairment and South Africanness (of 
whatever kind) that remains unelaborated in the text. As such, in 
this moment, and I’d suggest in the text at large, social and so-called 
natural models of disability are not read as contradictory but rather 
as coextensive, and both are equally subject to revision.
Eugene is, like Tom, an ambiguous figure who is neither a 
subject for immediate, sarcastic dismissal nor intrinsically laudable; 
he’s a well-intentioned white liberal patriarchal refugee. I would read 
Eugene’s implied “simple theory,” then, in addition to Elizabeth’s 
silence, as a gentle rebuke to Frantz Fanon’s overinvestment in a 
model of pathology, which is fundamentally a social model of cogni-
tive disability. Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth argues that the over-
riding psychological disability afflicting the subjects of colonialism is 
the denial of subjectivity or agency under colonialism. Fanon implies 
that colonial subjects could only overcome this debility through an-
ticolonial struggle: “After years of unreality, after wallowing in the 
most extraordinary phantasms, the colonized subject, machine gun 
at the ready, finally confronts the only force which challenges his 
very being: colonialism. . . . The colonized subject discovers reality 
and transforms it through his praxis, his deployment of violence and 
his agenda for liberation” (20–21). The proposition that colonial 
melancholia is socially contingent and could be resolved through 
collective social action—that “liberation . . . [was] a way out of, if not 
an actual cure for, a melancholia typically read as largely debilitating” 
(Flaugh 299)—runs the risk of eliding such cognitive impairments 
or deviations from neurotypicality that are not results of the colonial 
context. For Fanon, the originary alienation of colonialism over-
rides any other etiology—even etiologies stemming from similarly 
wholesale social inequity such as institutionalized misogyny. Simi-
larly, Eugene assumes that colonialism generates pathology, which 
stunningly elides South African as a coherent identity category and 
ignores the racial stratification that generates that pathology; Eugene 
therefore assumes that all mental disabilities in the colony are a re-
sult of that social structure. In so doing, he renders the particulars 
of Elizabeth’s experience meaningless or inaccessible to him, much 
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as Rhys obscures the possibility of Bertha’s madness outside of her 
marriage to Rochester.
Moreover, the Fanonian solution to that pathology—collective 
resistance against the colonizer—does not necessarily serve Elizabeth 
since the black cultural nationalism through which that resistance 
was primarily articulated excludes her as a Coloured woman as 
thoroughly as the white supremacist regime in South Africa would.8 
That being said, Elizabeth’s madness would seem to be at least in 
part a result of Elizabeth’s own racist indoctrination. It’s telling that 
during her first breakdown, she becomes agitated when a Tswana 
shopkeeper completes paperwork slowly: Elizabeth “sprang to her 
feet, slamming the chair back against the wall and shouted: ‘Oh you 
bloody bastard Batswana!! Oh you bloody bastard Batswana!!’ Then 
she simply opened her mouth in one, long, high, piercing scream” 
(51). This scene would suggest that Elizabeth’s cure at the end of 
the novel—achieved after she works on Eugene’s farming coopera-
tive and establishes friendships with some of the local laborers—is 
at least partially related to Elizabeth’s overcoming her estrangement 
from her African context and identity. However, even this reading of 
Elizabeth’s cure is subverted somewhat by the fact that her release 
from a mental ward at the novel’s close is a consequence of Elizabeth 
being interpreted as holding racist views:
A wild alarm-bell sounded off inside her. [The doctor] pushed the 
cup of tea towards her as though she were an old friend. She had to 
fight an impulse to jump up and run out of his office. He was stark 
raving mad too. He really hated black people . . . the shock of being 
thought of as a comrade racialist had abruptly restored a portion 
of her sanity. But she made no effort to convince him they were not 
on the same track.
 “Ah,” said the doctor. “You are better already. You are helping. 
You set the table for lunch. You will soon go home. You are cured.” 
(184)
There are three distinct notions of cure and madness being deployed 
here: first, Elizabeth identifies racial hatred in the white doctor, which 
she articulates as madness; second, the doctor pronounces her as 
“cured” by the vested authority of the medical institution, drawing 
the conclusion from Elizabeth’s successful performance of minor gen-
dered tasks; and, third, Elizabeth has a “portion of her sanity” restored 
in being hailed by the doctor in a discourse that she does not want 
to participate. Elizabeth, then, is at once officially “cured” by tacitly 
acquiescing to being interpellated as a racist and marginally “cured” 
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within her own rubric by silently resisting that interpellation. Again, 
we are not at any point given any solid ground on which to stand.
The novel’s ambivalent investments in the social model of dis-
ability would suggest that any unambiguous reading of the novel 
through the medical model of disability is out of the question; Eliza-
beth’s scorn for the “quack” in the mental ward makes this clear (182). 
This said, Elizabeth does at times seem to accept the possibility that 
she’s inherited her mother’s insanity directly: Elizabeth “wondered 
if the persecution had been so much the outcome of the principal’s 
twisted version of life, as the silent appeal of her dead mother: ‘Now 
you know. Do you think I can bear the stigma of insanity alone? 
Share it with me’” (17). What’s left ambiguous here is whether the 
dead mother means to share insanity or the stigma of insanity with 
Elizabeth. Still, after her first breakdown Elizabeth’s hallucinations 
return only after she has been hospitalized and sedated, which 
would suggest some relationship between Elizabeth’s body and her 
mental state. However, the failure of the sedative and of Elizabeth’s 
subsequent self-medication with alcohol and unnamed “tablets” (13) 
would again seem to undermine any straightforward application 
of the medical model to Elizabeth’s situation. Rather, if the novel 
posits an etiology for madness other than the social model, it ap-
pears to be something else entirely. Vexingly for the reader looking 
to find some evidence of the inherited colonial structures policing 
mental health as one more criterion for exclusion or surveillance, 
Elizabeth talks her way out of her hospital bed within fifteen hours of 
arriving there. Subsequently, when she’s told by her principal at the 
Motabeng Primary School that she needs to submit a “certificate of 
sanity from a medical officer” (66) to retain her position, Elizabeth 
refuses, to the distress of the principal, who imagines it would be 
“no trouble to get the certificate.” Elizabeth is only dismissed when 
her colleagues articulate their disdain for her as a foreigner; within 
the medical and educational context, the medically determined 
condition of “insanity,” which comes with paperwork signed by an 
authority figure, has less cache than the tacit social exclusion of an 
individual, which doesn’t. 
Brontë says madness is in the body, Rhys says madness is in 
society, and Donaldson says madness is in the body, which is in so-
ciety. I’d suggest that Head says madness is in the body, which is in 
society, but she also understands that the body and society are so 
contingently constructed in cases of extreme precarity—their borders 
so fluid—as to make meaningful distinctions moot. While neither 
Brontë nor Rhys offers solutions to their madwomen in attics, they 
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offer clear sources: Brontë’s Bertha Mason carries her madness inside 
of her like a disease, where Rhys’s Antoinette Cosway has madness 
forced on her by the confinements of a colonial, patriarchal mar-
riage from which she cannot physically escape. Head never tells us 
where madness comes from; indeed, she never seems to ask where 
it comes from. Ultimately, I suggest, the litany of dispossessions that 
Elizabeth endures as well as her inability to find a secure foothold in 
any identity category (embodiment, gender, race, class, language, na-
tion, ability) make the idea of picking one—of resolving the tangled 
ambiguity—ludicrous.
A caveat here would have to be that, whereas Brontë and 
Rhys are fairly thoroughly canonized writers such that Donaldson 
intervenes as much in their texts as she does in their texts’ impact 
on discourses around madness, Head is a marginal writer’s mar-
ginal writer. There’s some irony in the fact that her novel ends as it 
does, with a gesture of belonging when we don’t really know where 
the novel belongs. Any attempt to coordinate her position in the 
already peripheral postcolonial canon tends to run as a sequence 
of negations; she can be neither comfortably positioned within the 
Black Consciousness movement of the 1960s and 1970s, which was 
predominantly urban and masculine, nor, because of her geographi-
cal and cultural estrangement from the Coloured community in the 
Cape, comfortably placed in conversation with the prominent voices 
from that tradition, such as Alex La Guma, Zoe Wicomb, or Richard 
Rive. Her pattern of emigration also does not correspond neatly 
with South Africa’s writers in exile, who typically lit out for London, 
Berlin, or Paris rather than moving one border over from the apart-
heid state and settling in a rural outpost, as Head did. Further, she 
offers ambivalent narratives about her experience of mental illness 
in both her fiction and autobiography. To suggest that Head’s work 
is incomparable to anything else is both to risk sounding like a blurb 
and to undermine the comparative discipline that undergirds this 
essay. However, to derive a critical dividend from Head’s repeatedly 
marginal status seems to me to enact the interpretive violence regu-
larly brought to bear on postcolonial literature and on literature 
with disability in it; after all, this is clearly neither a straightforward 
story of individual cure standing in for a healing from the wounds 
of colonialism or of colonialism straightforwardly generating dis-
ability. This could just be the story of one individual’s disability in a 
post-and-colonial context. Nonetheless, we typically need fiction to 
mean more than itself, and my task here is specifically invested in 
making this text mean more than itself. Let me offer this. First, the 
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extremely fractured, repeatedly alienated nature of Head’s biography 
and fiction demonstrates some of the short circuits of the social, and 
to a somewhat lesser extent the medical, models of disability in the 
contexts of extreme precarity. Second, the conditions of extreme 
precarity that have historically been concentrated in the Global South 
(and cohered exceptionally in Head’s own life) are now being opened 
up on a global scale by the ceaseless demands of capital. This being 
the case, do disability studies’ models for thinking about disability 
still belong? And if so, how? 
Notes
1. “Coloured” in the South African context, while derived from apartheid-
era racial taxonomies, describes and has largely been claimed by people 
of mixed racial and ethnic heritage, though not without some ambiva-
lence.
2. For more on how Head forges affiliation at the communal and regional 
level, see Nixon. See Rose for more on how Head forges affiliation by 
way of universalist humanism. Finally, Patke discusses how Head forges 
a universalist affiliation that exceeds the human.
3. I am grateful to Andrew Thomas and Elinor Hayden for furnishing me 
with this and other timely insights.
4. By contrast, James’s stories persistently concern themselves with such 
interpretation. According to Todorov in The Structural Analysis of Litera-
ture, “the motive force of Henry James’s stories, that which determines 
their structure, is the essential secret . . . [that] consists precisely in the 
existence of a secret as such, of an absolute and absent cause, and in the 
effort to discover this secret, to make the absence present” (99). Head 
exerts no such effort; in fact, she strains in every direction but toward 
such a discovery.
5. Todorov’s “Narrative Transformations” is useful in its discussion of 
the Russian formalist terms fabula, the order or events referred to be 
a narrative, and syuzhet, the order of events as they are presented in 
a narrative. Brooks is instructive in his renovation of these terms for 
thinking through the modern novel.
6. Fanon identifies precisely this mechanism of initiation into indigenous, 
occult traditions as an anticolonial, liberatory practice in “On Violence”: 
“The atmosphere of myth and magic frightens me and so takes on an 
undoubted reality. By terrifying me, it integrates me in the traditions 
and the history of my district or of my tribe, and at the same time it 
reassures me, it gives me a status, as it were an identification paper” 
(43).
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7. Scholars have pointed out that Elizabeth is also estranged from her own 
body. In fact, much has been made, critically, of the passage in which 
Elizabeth reflects, following another attack by Medusa, that “it was not 
maddening to her to be told she hadn’t a vagina. She might have had but 
it was not such a pleasant area of the body to concentrate on, possibly 
only now and then if necessary” (44). See particularly Kim for more on 
Head’s complication of subjectivity in the context of liberation politics. 
Frankly, I’m not sure how to read Medusa. She is described as a kind of 
unassimilable, monolithic representative of a “surface reality of African 
society . . . shut in and exclusive” (38); but that she should be named by 
a classical referent for an orientalized, monstrous, feminine Other sits 
uncomfortably with me. Hélène Cixous’s 1980 refurbishment of that 
referent in “Laugh of the Medusa,” which posits an écriture feminine 
not far removed from that which Head deploys here, further complicates 
that uncertainty.
8. Another caveat here in that the Black Consciousness Movement of 
the 70s was pushing to redefine the term “black” as a label to describe 
anybody oppressed by white supremacy, though the success of that cam-
paign was not universal. We may read this exclusion, then, as deriving 
from a mixture of Elizabeth’s racist indoctrination and the strategically 
essentializing logic of anticolonial racial rhetoric.
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